Locked & verifiable.
A pre-registered claim, anchored to a SHA-256 hash before the run. Anyone can re-derive it from the canonical bytes below.
SHA-256
942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbcRegistered2026-08-13T09:39:51.174Z
Independent timestampRFC 3161 · 2026-08-13T09:39:51Z · timestamp.sigstore.dev · token
Transparency logRekor v2 · log2025-1.rekor.sigstore.dev · index 63909772 · inclusion proof
Kindraw hash anchor — not a conforming PRML manifest (missing required field: version)
Manifest
linkage_version: prml-linkage/0 manifest_hash: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa receipt: null run: dataset_hash: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 environment: registry-e2e id: live-e2e-test model_version: null started_at: '2026-08-13T12:00:00Z'raw bytes →
README badge
[](https://registry.falsify.dev/942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbc)Verify in CI
- uses: studio-11-co/prml-verify-action@v2
with:
mode: verdict
expected-hash: 942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbcgithub.com/studio-11-co/prml-verify-action →Verify this hash yourself
Paste your manifest YAML. The canonical hash must match 942e1a761f81…. This runs the registry's own canonicalization module (canonical.js) in your browser; for verification that does not trust this registry at all, use any of the four reference implementations offline.
Verify the independent timestamp (RFC 3161, offline)
The token countersigns this manifest hash with the timestamp authority's key, so the time claim no longer rests on this registry. Verify with OpenSSL 3 (LibreSSL, the macOS default, cannot check the ESS extension):
curl -sO https://registry.falsify.dev/942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbc.tsr
curl -s https://timestamp.sigstore.dev/api/v1/timestamp/certchain -o chain.pem
awk 'split_after==1{n++;split_after=0} /END CERTIFICATE/{split_after=1} {print > ("tsa-" n ".pem")}' n=0 chain.pem
openssl ts -verify -digest 942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbc \
-in 942e1a761f81fa34fbd394f7e2fb09bd51e458be97f4c98ddf78fb5f0287cbbc.tsr -CAfile tsa-1.pem -untrusted tsa-0.pem
Expected output: Verification: OK.
What this receipt proves — and what it does not
- Proves: these manifest bytes hashed to this SHA-256, and the registry attests (Ed25519 signature over hash + timestamp, key at /pubkey) that it saw the hash at the recorded time.
- Timestamp: where an RFC 3161 token is present (the "Independent timestamp" row above), the time claim is countersigned by a public timestamp authority and verifiable offline; backdating it would require compromising that authority, not just this registry. Records without a token rest on the registry's clock alone until anchored. Where a "Transparency log" row is present, the hash is additionally mirrored to the public Sigstore Rekor log with a verifiable inclusion proof.
- Does not prove: the claimed result. A PRML receipt proves the bar was locked before the run — never that the result is good.
- The signature covers hash + timestamp only, not the submitted handle. There is no key-rotation story yet; the current key id is served at /pubkey.
- Limitations: the registry itself is a signed key-value store, not an append-only log — per-record non-equivocation comes from the Rekor entry, and records committed before full-manifest storage (2026-07-11) carry their RFC 3161 token only. No long-term storage guarantee: mirror your hashes in your own infrastructure.
PRML v0.2 is a frozen RFC (comment window closed 2026-05-22) — spec.falsify.dev/v0.2-rfc. Editor: spec.falsify.dev/editor.