Locked & verifiable.

Paste your manifest YAML. The canonical hash must match fbec1be1aa3a…. This runs the registry's own canonicalization module (canonical.js) in your browser; for verification that does not trust this registry at all, use any of the four reference implementations offline.

The token countersigns this manifest hash with the timestamp authority's key, so the time claim no longer rests on this registry. Verify with OpenSSL 3 (LibreSSL, the macOS default, cannot check the ESS extension):

curl -sO https://registry.falsify.dev/fbec1be1aa3af8c4bd40c3107185067ed55e002d1c2d944a55207ff67e8e3a6f.tsr
curl -s https://timestamp.sigstore.dev/api/v1/timestamp/certchain -o chain.pem
awk 'split_after==1{n++;split_after=0} /END CERTIFICATE/{split_after=1} {print > ("tsa-" n ".pem")}' n=0 chain.pem
openssl ts -verify -digest fbec1be1aa3af8c4bd40c3107185067ed55e002d1c2d944a55207ff67e8e3a6f \
  -in fbec1be1aa3af8c4bd40c3107185067ed55e002d1c2d944a55207ff67e8e3a6f.tsr -CAfile tsa-1.pem -untrusted tsa-0.pem

Expected output: Verification: OK.

• Proves: these manifest bytes hashed to this SHA-256, and the registry attests (Ed25519 signature over hash + timestamp, key at /pubkey) that it saw the hash at the recorded time.
• Timestamp: where an RFC 3161 token is present (the "Independent timestamp" row above), the time claim is countersigned by a public timestamp authority and verifiable offline; backdating it would require compromising that authority, not just this registry. Records without a token rest on the registry's clock alone until anchored. Where a "Transparency log" row is present, the hash is additionally mirrored to the public Sigstore Rekor log with a verifiable inclusion proof.
• Does not prove: ordering, or the claimed result. A PRML receipt establishes that these criteria existed no later than the recorded time; it does not establish that the evaluation ran afterwards — that is what a prml-linkage/0 record is for — and it never establishes that the result is good.
• The signature covers hash + timestamp only, not the submitted handle. There is no key-rotation story yet; the current key id is served at /pubkey.
• Limitations: the registry itself is a signed key-value store, not an append-only log — per-record non-equivocation comes from the Rekor entry, and records committed before full-manifest storage (2026-07-11) carry their RFC 3161 token only. No long-term storage guarantee: mirror your hashes in your own infrastructure.